The 'punch a Nazi' meme: what are the ethics of punching Nazis?

When a KKK-endorsed alleged sexual assaulter can be elected to the White House, many are rightfully fearful. People of colour are increasingly worried about the normalisation of racism. Many once thought racism would get no further than the lips of a racist relative or a poorly-worded Facebook post. Now these views are entering the Oval Office and federalbuildings, given weight by chants and placards and verifiedTwitteraccounts.

On 20 January, Richard Spencer, a prominent figure in the “alt-right” movement, was punched in the face while giving an interview in Washington. The punch spawned a number of “punch a Nazi” memes. It could be said that seeing a prominent representative of racist views being punched brings catharsis in a world that appears to be slouching toward Nazism.

For many, there’s solidarity, as people laugh at the awful racist’s discomfort. For too many, Nazism is viewed as merely another opinion – not an inherent threat – so a punched Nazi is something small to celebrate. In response, others have equated punching a Nazi with Nazism. “You are just as bad as they are!” is the claim. This is when “We’re better than this!” is a cover for “This upsets me!”.

The moral question remains unanswered.

The view from moral systems

Most of us have no trouble accepting the view “violence is bad”. But what makes it “bad”? Moral philosophers have grappled with this for millennia.

One of the most well-known moral systems deals with rules. The basis for a rule-based morality derives from “universality” – could we make a rule we want applied everywhere, consistently? Take some popular examples: “Treat others as we want to be treated”, “don’t harm others unnecessarily”, “be kind where possible”. It’s hard to imagine a good reason to oppose these.

When a rule is worth following, it becomes “good”. This is why many agree “violence is bad” is a moral rule: it can be applied universally. Where rule-based morality runs into problems is when two moral rules conflict.

In this case, a rule we support is: “stopping Nazism is good”. Another is: “violence is bad”. This returns us to a dilemma instead of solving it. At the very least, we are able to clearly outline the issue.

Many might say this rule only requires amendments: “Violence is bad, except when it can stop Nazism.” Yet this gives priority to “stopping Nazism” over preventing violence. If “stopping Nazism” meant extreme violence, then extreme violence is justified according to this rule. We could keep making amendments but doing so could continue forever.

Another way philosophers deliberate morality is through consequences. If an action brings more happiness into the world, then that action is good. If punching a Nazi means preventing Nazism, then punching Nazis is justified. The ends justify the means.

Yet this gives a blank cheque to any action if we can justify more good. For example, if killing one innocent means saving hundreds, then murder is justified. 

Courtesy of Guardian News & Media Ltd